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Implementation with renegotiation when preferences
and feasible sets are state dependent
Luis Corchón · Matteo Triossi
Abstract In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible
allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is
represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice
Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion
functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementa-
tion of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of
bargaining and taxation.
1 Introduction
Since Hurwicz’s classic papers in the early 1970s, a great deal of attention has been
devoted to the problem of implementing social choice rules when preferences are
state dependent (see Jackson 2001 for a survey). In contrast, very few contributions
have dealt with the problem of implementing social choice rules when the set of
feasible outcomes is state dependent. The problem is that, in this case, some mes-
sages yield infeasible allocations, which requires that we describe how to deal with
them. The standard approach is to design a series of mechanisms in which the planner
can ex-post verify whether or not players are exaggerating individual endowments or
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technological capabilities (i.e., by asking them to put endowments on the table).1 If
an infeasibility occurs, players expect serious punishment (Hurwicz et al. 1995; Tian
1993; Tian and Li 1995; Hong 1995, 1996, 1998; Serrano and Vohra 1997; Dagan
et al. 1999).2
In this paper, we present a theory of how to deal with infeasibilities which is based
on the idea that infeasible allocations are renegotiated. Consider the following exam-
ple: The associate editor of a journal is in charge of a special issue for which she has
selected 10 authors. She asks each author to submit a 20-page paper. One of the authors
submits a 22-page paper and another author submits an 18-page one. In this case, it
is likely that the editor will take no action. However, if both authors submit 22-page
papers, she will have to deal with the infeasibility. It is likely that she will work with
the authors to shorten the papers or with the managing editor in order to free up more
pages, etc. In this case, feasibility is restored by means of negotiation. Another exam-
ple is the legal system: once infeasibilities are detected, there are institutions designed
to punish transgressors (if they can be identified) and to restore feasibility.3 Thus, the
process used to deal with infeasibilities may reflect how agents renegotiate or how
institutions operate. Furthermore, it is independent on the mechanism that created the
infeasibility.
We model the social process that transforms infeasible allocations into feasible
ones by means of a reversion function. This concept originates in Maskin and Moore
(1999) and has been developed by Jackson and Palfrey (2001). In these papers, the
reversion function formalizes the process of renegotiation through which agents trade
goods allocated by the mechanism or veto some feasible allocations. In our case, the
reversion function represents the way in which society reacts to infeasible alloca-
tions. Consequently, the properties that we impose on the reversion function are very
different from those assumed by earlier literature.
For the purposes of this paper, we assume complete information. This is a clean
scenario which looks to be a good candidate for a first trial of our approach. We
focus on Nash implementation and assume that agents know the reversion function.
Therefore, the reversion function induces new preferences, which we will call reverted
preferences (this is the “translation principle” in Maskin and Moore (1999)). Reverted
preferences are state dependent even if underlying preferences are not. Hence, when
the feasible set is state dependent, implementation reduces to the case of implementa-
tion when only preferences are state dependent. However, as Maskin and Moore put
it, “results from the standard literature are too abstract to give a clear indication of
how serious a constraint renegotiation is….”
We focus our attention on a class of reversion function in which, should an infeasi-
bility arise, at least one agent is made worse off. We call this a non-rewarding reversion
1 This assumption is called the “no exaggeration assumption.” It implies that agents use different message
spaces at different states of the world, see Hong (1998, p. 206, ll. 17–19).
2 The work on manipulation via endowments (Postlewaite 1979; Atlamaz and Klaus 2007) is also related
to this literature.
3 We can think of the feasible set including not only the properly feasible allocations, but also all punish-
ments and additional devices that can be administered by the institutions designed, as well as the delays
that may occur.
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function. Reversion functions considered by the previous literature on renegotiation
do not fall into this class because they assume that agents are made better off by
renegotiating. The difference is explained by the fact that in their case, renegotiation
comes from the inability of the mechanism to stop agents from reaching mutually
beneficial trades. In our case, renegotiation arises from the physical impossibility of
carrying out the intended plans so that somebody has to make a sacrifice in order
to achieve feasibility. The class of non-rewarding reversion functions is too wide,
though. Given the novelty of our approach, we think that to look for a characteriza-
tion of implementable social choice rules under this class is a too ambitious task. A
more modest research strategy is to charter the boundaries of implementable social
choice rules when reversion functions are non-rewarding. We do this by introducing an
extreme case of non-rewarding reversion function where, should an infeasibility arise,
all agents are punished so that they strictly prefer any allocation without punishment
to the situation in which they are punished. This strong form of punishment, which
we will call generalized severe, resembles the one implicitly assumed by the previous
literature. In our case it serves an instrumental role: it provides necessary conditions
for the implementation of social choice rules if the reversion function is generalized
severe (Proposition 1). Thus, generalized severe reversion functions may be helpful
to direct further research on this topic because they are manageable and if a social
choice rule is non implementable with a generalized severe reversion function it is not
implementable under any non-rewarding reversion function.
A simple adaptation of the classic results shows that monotonicity is a necessary
and almost sufficient condition for implementation in Nash equilibrium when reverted
preferences are given by the generalized severe reversion function (Remark 1). Thus,
our first task is to characterize monotonicity. We show that it is equivalent to a weak
form of individual rationality and a generalized form of contraction consistency (Prop-
osition 2). The former property is satisfied by most social choice rules and the latter
is similar to Nash independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Next, we apply the previous result to several frameworks and compare our findings
with the earlier literature. We begin by considering exchange economies. Here, the
non-rewarding condition may be violated unless renegotiation is sufficiently costly.
In this case, the non-rewarding condition can be considered as a simplification that
narrows down the class of renegotiation functions and thus is useful for obtaining
analytical results. We prove that in these environments, weak unanimity is trivially
satisfied by any individually rational social choice rule. But the individual rational-
ity requirement, which is necessary and sufficient for feasible implementation in the
set-up considered by Hurwicz et al. (1995), is not necessary nor sufficient for imple-
mentation in our framework. This is due to the fact that in our case a generalized form
of contraction consistency must be satisfied as well. We show that the Constrained
Walrasian Rule satisfies generalized contraction consistency and is thus implement-
able (Proposition 3). Next, we turn our attention to bargaining problems. We show
that the Nash Bargaining solution can be implemented if the disagreement point is not
state dependent (Proposition 4). This agrees with the findings obtained by Serrano and
Vohra (1997) and Naeve (1999) in a different framework. We also show that the Kalai–
Smorodinski solution is not implementable. Finally, we consider the taxation problem
in which the mechanism must collect a given amount of taxes. We describe the taxation
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rules that can be implemented and find that any taxation rule which continuously varies
on incomes whenever incomes are larger than proposed taxes cannot be implemented
in our framework. This contrasts with a result by Dagan et al. (1999) in which, assum-
ing that agents cannot exaggerate anyone’s income, they are able to implement any
taxation method. The difference between our approaches is that the no exaggeration
assumption in their case rules out deviations that are possible in our model.
In the sections that follow, we describe the model (Sect. 2), introduce reversion
functions (Sect. 3) and study implementation under the assumption that the reversion
function is non-rewarding (Sects. 4, 5) before presenting our conclusions (Sect. 6).
2 The model
In this section we provide the main definitions. Let us first describe the environment.
Let I = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents. Let ωi denote agent i’s type and let Ωi denote
agent i’s type set. Let Ω ⊆ ∏ni=1 Ωi be the set of all possible states of the world. Each
ω ∈ Ω yields a feasible set A(ω) and a preference profile R(ω) = (R1(ω), ..., Rn(ω)).
The feasible set A(ω) contains all feasible allocations including punishments that arise
at state ω. Set A ≡ ⋃ω∈Ω A(ω). Ri (ω) is a preference relation, a complete, reflexive
and transitive binary relation on A(ω). Pi (ω) denotes the corresponding strict prefer-
ence relation. Let Li (a, ω) = {x ∈ A(ω) : a Ri (ω)x} be agent i’s lower contour set
of a at ω.
A correspondence F : Ω  A such that F(ω) ⊆ A(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω will be
called a Social Choice Rule (SCR for brevity). A mechanism is a pair (M, g) where
M ≡ ∏ni=1 Mi is the message space and g : M → A is the outcome function.
Mi denotes agent i’s message space. Let m = (m1, .., mn) ∈ M be a list of mes-
sages, also written (mi , m−i ). Given ω ∈ Ω, a mechanism (M, g) induces a game
(M, g, R(ω)). A message profile m∗ ∈ M is a Nash equilibrium for (M, g, R(ω)) if,
for all i ∈ I, g(m∗)Ri (ω)g(mi , m∗−i ) for all mi ∈ Mi . NE(M, g, R(ω)) will denote
the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of (M, g, R(ω)). The mechanism (M, g) imple-
ments F in Nash equilibrium if NE(M, g, R(ω)) = F(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω .
3 Reversion functions
Since outcomes that are feasible in some states may be infeasible in others, we must
describe how society deals with infeasible allocations. We assume that if an allocation
is infeasible, it is transformed into a feasible one. The systematic way in which the
reallocation process takes place will be called a reversion function.4 This reallocation
may correspond to a “free-market renegotiation” or to a process where an institu-
tion applies some rule, i.e., a rationing scheme, a bankruptcy rule, penalties to some
individuals, etc. Formally:
Definition 1 A reversion function is a map h : A × Ω → A such that, for every
ω ∈ Ω: (i) h(a, ω) ∈ A(ω) for all a ∈ A and (ii) h(a, ω) = a for all a ∈ A(ω).
4 See Amorós (2004) for a model with several reversion functions.
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A reversion function always yields feasible allocations (condition (i) above) and
feasible allocations are not renegotiated (condition (ii) above). The latter condition is
postulated in order to separate the issue of mutually advantageous renegotiation, which
was the focus of the previous literature, from the issue of infeasibility, which is the
focus of this paper.5 In other words, this condition allows us to analyze renegotiation
caused by infeasibility alone.
Under weak conditions, if the reversion function can be chosen by the planner, any
single valued SCR can be implemented (a proof is available upon request). But the
designer, by assumption, cannot condition her actions on the state of the world.
To explain the next concept, consider the simplest possible case: at states of the
world ω and ω′ the preference profiles are the same, say R. Let a, b, and c be three
allocations that are feasible at state ω. Assume that a Pi bPi c for some agent i . Allo-
cation a is not feasible at state ω′ and is renegotiated to c, allocation b is feasible at
ω′. So, even if the underlying preferences are the same in both states, player i prefers
a to b at state ω and b to a at ω′. In order to formalize and extend this idea, we offer
the following definition.
Definition 2 Given ω ∈ Ω and a reversion function h, the reversion of R(ω) on A(ω),
denoted by Rh(ω), is defined by:
a Rhi (ω)b ⇐⇒ h(a, ω)Ri (ω)h(b, ω), for all a, b ∈ A, for all i ∈ I. (1)
Then, when the reversion function is h, we can interpret that agents’ preferences are
the reverted preferences, i.e., they only care about reverted allocations. Let Lhi (a, ω) ={b ∈ A : h(a, ω)Ri (ω)h(b, ω)} be the lower contour set of a at ω with respect to
Rhi (ω).
The next definition is a straightforward adaptation of the standard notion of imple-
mentation in Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3 A SCR F is h-implementable in Nash Equilibrium if there exists a game
form (M, g) such that, for all ω ∈ Ω:
F(ω) = h(NE(M, g, Rh(ω)), ω).
In words, F is h-implementable in Nash equilibrium if and only if it is imple-
mentable in Nash equilibrium when, for each ω ∈ Ω , the correspondent preference
profile is Rh (ω). Once we consider that agents’ preferences are induced by the rever-
sion function, we can deal with h-implementation exactly in the same way as in the
classical implementation problem.
When considering the restrictions that a state dependent feasible set imposes on
implementation, we concentrate on monotonicity (or Maskin monotonicity). Mono-
tonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for a SCR to be implementable
in Nash equilibrium (see Maskin and Moore 1999; Repullo 1987; Jackson 2001). It
is therefore the first condition to be addressed. When a SCR satisfies monotonicity,
5 A tautological interpretation is that A(ω) is the set of allocations that are not renegotiated at ω.
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if an alternative is implemented at one state of the world and rises in every agent’s
preference ranking at another state of the world, then it must be implemented also at
the second state. Now we restate the definition of monotonicity in terms of reverted
preferences. Let h be a reversion function.
Definition 4 A social choice rule F is h-monotonic if, for all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω and for every
a ∈ A such that h(a, ω) ∈ F(ω)
Lhi (a, ω) ⊆ Lhi (a, ω′) for all i 
⇒ h(a, ω′) ∈ F(ω′).
Similarly, a SCR F that satisfies h-no veto power must select an allocation which
is at the top of the reverted preference ranking of all agents except at most one. The
importance of these concepts is highlighted by the following remark, whose proof is
a straightforward adaptation of a standard result mentioned before and is therefore
omitted:
Remark 1 If a social choice rule is h-implementable in Nash equilibrium, it is
h-monotonic. Moreover, in environments in which #I > 2 if a social choice rule
is h-monotonic and satisfies h-no veto power, it is h-implementable in Nash equilib-
rium.
4 Non-rewarding reversion functions: basic results
In principle, the reversion function can take any form which makes difficult to char-
acterize which SCR can be implemented (i.e., to check h-monotonicity). Thus, we
need to restrict the possibilities opened by renegotiation. Since we assumed that only
infeasible allocations are renegotiated, it seems natural to assume that renegotiation
cannot be advantageous for all players. We will formalize this idea by the concept of
non-rewarding reversion function. This concept is discussed in detail after we present
a formal definition below. Clearly, this is not the only possibility to reduce the set of
reversion functions and our approach is only a first cut at the problem. We show that a
necessary condition for a SCR to be h-implementable when h is non-rewarding is that
this SCR is h-implementable when the reversion function takes a particularly simple
form. It is the case where, should an infeasibility arise, the reversion achieves the worst
possible allocation. We will call the latter generalized severe. Having simplified the
problem to the point in which we have singled out a unique reversion function, we
characterize h-implementable SCR when h is generalized severe. Thus, we provide
necessary conditions for h -implementation under non-rewarding reversion functions.6
Definition 5 A reversion function h is non-rewarding if, for all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω and all
a ∈ A (ω):
6 It may be argued that a generalized severe reversion does not fit well with the idea of renegotiation. But
recall that generalized severe reversion is just a way to show which SCR might be implemented under
non-rewarding renegotiation and not a realistic description of how renegotiation is conducted. A compari-
son with the revelation principle may be useful. Direct mechanisms are used not because they are realistic
or have good properties but because they provide necessary conditions for the existence of implementing
mechanisms and thus they are helpful to clear the field.
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(i) if a /∈ A (ω′) there exists i ∈ I such Lhi (a, ω)  Lhi (a, ω′).
(ii) if there exist i ∈ I and b ∈ A with a Ri (ω)h(b, ω) and h(b, ω′)Pi (ω′)h(a, ω′)
then there exist j and c ∈ A(ω′) such that a R j (ω)h(c, ω) with cPj (ω′)h(a, ω′).
The first condition asserts that if an allocation a passes from being feasible at state
ω to being infeasible at state ω′ not all agents improve their positions. Notice that
it does not imply that anybody is punished for the infeasibility. The change of a in
the ranking when passing from state ω to state ω′ might simply reflect a shift in the
underlying preferences like in the theory of implementation with a fixed feasible set.
The second condition takes care of this aspect. It implies that if there is a preference
reversal around an allocation a which is feasible at ω and it does not reflects a shift
in the underlying preferences (the case where b ∈ A (ω) ∩ A (ω′)), then somebody
has actually to pay the cost of the renegotiation passing from state ω′ to state ω: an
allocation c ∈ A(ω′) which was strictly better than a at ω′ in some agent’s prefer-
ences, is renegotiated to an allocation which belongs to the lower contour set of a at
ω, with respect to the preferences of the same agent. In particular, conditions (i) and
(ii) together imply that when an allocation passes from being feasible at state ω, to
being infeasible at ω′ at least one agent suffers as a consequence of infeasibility in
a way that could have been accomplished through a feasible allocation (for instance,
the agent who is deemed responsible for the infeasibility is punished).
Another interpretation of condition (ii) is the following. If a is feasible at state ω
the strict upper contour set cannot be larger for every agent when passing from state ω′
to state ω, unless this enlargement depends on a change in the underlying preferences.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are independent. It is easy to write an example where (ii)
holds and (i) does not.7 Next, we present an example where (ii) holds and (i) does not.
This example will be helpful in explaining condition (ii).
Example 1 There are two states of the world ω and ω′ and two agents i = 1, 2. The
feasible sets are A (ω) = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} and A
(
ω′
) = {a1, a′2, a3, a4, a5
}
. Pref-
erences for agent 1 are a5 P1 (ω) a1 P1 (ω) a2 P1 (ω) a4 P1 (ω) a3 and a5 P1
(
ω′
)
a′2 P1(
ω′
)
a1 P1
(
ω′
)
a4 P1
(
ω′
)
a3. Preferences for agent 2 are a3 P2 (ω) a5 P2 (ω) a1 P2(ω)
a2 P2 (ω) a4 and a5 P2
(
ω′
)
a1 P2
(
ω′
)
a4 P2
(
ω′
)
a′2 P2
(
ω′
)
a3. The reversion function
is h
(
a2, ω′
) = a′2 and h
(
a′2, ω
) = a5. This reversion function satisfies condition
(i) in Definition 5. Indeed, a2 Ph2 (ω) a4, a4 Ph2
(
ω′
)
a2 and a′2 Ph2
(
ω′
)
a3, a3 Ph2 (ω)
a′2. However, it does not satisfy condition (ii) in Definition 5. Indeed, a1 Ph1 (ω) a2 and
a2 Ph2
(
ω′
)
a1 but there is no c ∈ A
(
ω′
)
such that cPhi
(
ω′
)
a1 and a1 Phi (ω) c for some
i ∈ {1, 2} because h (a′2, ω
) = a5 Pi (ω) a1 for i = 1, 2.
In Example 1, a2 goes up in agent’s 1 ranking with respect to a1 passing from state
ω to state ω′. Condition (i) is satisfied because a2 change her position with respect
to a4 passing from state ω to state ω′ and a′2 change its position with respect to a3
passing from state ω′ to state ω. This change only reflects a change in the underlying
preferences. Notice that allocation a5 is preferred to a1 by both agents at state ω and
at state ω′. Allocation a′2 is better that a1 at state ω′ in the preferences of agent 1 but
7 Available upon request.
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it not feasible at state ω. Allocation a′2 is renegotiated to allocation a5 at state ω so
condition (ii) does not hold.
Notice that there is nothing pathological about the renegotiation function used in
Example 1. This leads us to think that the second part of Definition 5 indeed has a bite.
However, we will see in next section that there are natural renegotiation functions that
fulfill this condition.
Consider now a specific family of reversion functions: suppose that, should an
infeasibility arise, players are redirected to what they consider to be the worst possible
allocation. This reversion function resembles the (implicit) assumption made in previ-
ous papers that agents do not choose infeasible messages because the planner detects
infeasibility and imposes a punishment in such a way that agents strictly prefer any
other feasible allocation to this punishment. However, our interest in this particular
reversion function arises from the fact that it allows us to find the maximal set of SCR
that can be implemented under non-rewarding renegotiation (see Proposition 1). Let
G ∈ A(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω be such that a Pi (ω)G for all i , for all a ∈ A(ω)\ {G}.
We assume that, for all ω ∈ Ω , the feasible set A (ω) contains at least one allocation
different from G. G will be called the generalized punishment point because all agents
are penalized.
Definition 6 A reversion function is generalized severe if s(a, ω) = G if a /∈ A(ω).
The induced preferences will be denoted by Rs(ω). Preferences Rs are character-
ized by the following three properties:
(1) If a, b ∈ A(ω) then a Rsi (ω)b if and only if a Ri (ω)b for all i ∈ I .
(2) If a ∈ A(ω) with a = G and b /∈ A(ω) then a Psi (ω)b for all i ∈ I .
(3) If a, b /∈ A(ω) then aI si (ω)b for all i ∈ I .
We assume that the planner never wants to implement alternative G. Formally, we
consider only social choice rules F such that G /∈ F (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω .
A generalized severe reversion function punishes players for the implementation
of infeasible allocations. A rewarding reversion function can provide the opposite
incentives. There exist SCR that are implementable using a rewarding h but not using
a generalized severe reversion function. Let Ω = {ω,ω′} , A(ω) = {a, b, c, G} and
A(ω′) = {a, b, G}. Let n = 2 and Ri (ω) = Ri (ω′) = R for i = 1, 2 where bPa Pc.
Let F(ω) = a and F(ω′) = b. Let h(c, ω′) = b. The function h does not satisfy the
non-rewarding assumption at c. F is h-implementable in NE by the simple mechanism
where agent 1 chooses among a and c, but it cannot be implemented with a generalized
severe reversion function because F is not monotonic with respect to preferences Rs .
We show that generalized severe reversion functions implement the largest set of
social choice rules among the class of non-rewarding reversion functions where h-no
veto power holds.
Proposition 1 Let F be an h-monotonic SCR. If h is non-rewarding, then F is mono-
tonic with a generalized severe reversion function. Thus, if F satisfies h-no veto power,
it is implementable in Nash Equilibrium with a generalized severe reversion function.
Proof In the proof s denotes the generalized severe reversion function. Let a ∈ F (ω)
and assume that for some ω′, Lsi (a, ω) ⊆ Lsi (a, ω′) for every i ∈ I . First, we show that
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a ∈ A (ω′) . We prove the claim by contradiction: assume that a /∈ A (ω′). In this case,
Lsi (a, ω
′) = {G} ∪ A\A (ω′), so Lsi (a, ω) = (Li (a, ω) ∩ A (ω))∪ A\A (ω) ⊆ {G} ∪
A\A (ω′). It follows that A\A (ω) ⊆ A\A (ω′) so A (ω′) ⊆ A (ω). The reversion
function h is non-rewarding and a /∈ A (ω′), so Lhi (a, ω)  Lhi
(
a, ω′
)
. Then, there
exists b such that a Ri (ω)h(b, ω) and h(b, ω′)P(ω′)a. From the definition of a non-
rewarding reversion function there exist j and c ∈ A(ω′) such that a R j (ω)h(c, ω) and
cPj (ω′)h(a, ω′), but h(c, ω) = c, because A
(
ω′
) ⊆ A (ω), which yields a contradic-
tion because Lsj (a, ω) ⊆ Lsj (a, ω′). Then it must be the case that a ∈ A
(
ω′
)
. In order
to complete the proof it suffices to show that Lhi (a, ω) ⊆ Lhi (a, ω′) for every i ∈ I .
We prove the claim by contradiction: assume that there exist i ∈ I and b ∈ A such that
a Ri (ω)h(b, ω) and h(b, ω)Pi (ω′)a. From the definition of a non-rewarding reversion
function there exist j and c ∈ A(ω′) such that a R j (ω)h(c, ω) with cPj (ω′)h(a, ω′).
If c ∈ A(ω) then h(c, ω) = c ∈ Lsj (a, ω)\Lsj (a, ω′), a contradiction. If c /∈ A(ω)
then s(c, ω) = G and c ∈ Lsj (a, ω)\Lsj (a, ω′), a contradiction. The last claim follows
because h-no veto power implies no veto power with a generalized severe reversion
function. unionsq
The reverse of Proposition 1 does not hold. There exist non-rewarding h and SCR
F such that F is monotonic under generalized severe reversion but not h-mono-
tonic. Let Ω = {ω,ω′} , A (ω′) = {a, b, c, d, e, G} and A (ω) = {a, c, d, e, G}. Let
n = 2. Let d P1 (ω) cP1 (ω) a P1 (ω) e and let d P1
(
ω′
)
cP1
(
ω′
)
bP1
(
ω′
)
a P1 (ω) e.
Let eP2 (ω) cP2 (ω) d P2 (ω) a and let bP2
(
ω′
)
a P2
(
ω′
)
cP2
(
ω′
)
eP2
(
ω′
)
d. Let
h (b, ω) = d . The reversion function h is non-rewarding. Let f defined by f (ω) =
{a} , f (ω′) = {b}. The social choice function f is implementable in Nash equi-
librium under generalized severe reversion by the simple mechanism where agent 1
chooses among a and b. However Lh1 (a, ω) = Lh1
(
a, ω′
) = {a, e, G} , Lh2 (a, ω) =
{a, e, G} ⊆ {a, d, e, G} = Lh2
(
a, ω′
)
, so f is not h-monotonic. In the exam-
ple Lhi (a, ω) ⊆ Lhi (a, ω′) for i = 1, 2, but Ls1(a, ω)  Ls1(a, ω′). Indeed,
b ∈ A (ω′) \ A (ω) and bP1
(
ω′
)
a so b can be used to prevent the implementa-
tion of a at state ω′ when the generalized severe reversion function is used. However,
the same b cannot be used to prevent the implementation of f at ω′ if h is used because
h (b, ω) = d so b /∈ Lhi (a, ω) for i = 1, 2.
We now introduce two properties that are necessary and sufficient for h-monoto-
nicity under generalized severe reversion.
Definition 7 A SCR F satisfies Weak Unanimity (WU) if, for all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω such that
A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω) and for all a ∈ A(ω)\A(ω′) such that Li (a, ω) ⊆ {G} ∪ A\A(ω′) for
all i ∈ I, a /∈ F(ω).
Assume that all alternatives that are available at ω′ are available at ω, too. Let a be
available at ω but not at ω′. WU prescribes that if all alternatives that are available at
ω′ are strictly better than a at state ω for all agents, the planner should not choose to
implement a at state ω. Breaking WU would create a problem of coordination at state
ω′: if such an a was chosen at state ω, any Nash equilibrium yielding a at ω would be
a Nash equilibrium at ω′ too, yielding h
(
a, ω′
) = G.
Notice that WU is equivalent to the following condition: if A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω) and
a ∈ F(ω)\A(ω′) then there exists b ∈ A(ω′), such that a Ri (ω) b for some i ∈ I . If
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WU holds, such a b can be used to prevent the implementation of G at state ω′. When
the feasible set does not depend on the state of the world WU holds emptily.
Definition 8 A SCR F satisfies Generalized Contraction Consistency (GCC) if, for
all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω, and for all a ∈ F(ω) ∩ A(ω′) such that Li (a, ω) ∩ A(ω′) ⊆ Li (a, ω′)
and A(ω′)\A(ω) ⊆ Li (a, ω′) for all i ∈ I, a ∈ F(ω′).
When preferences are fixed and A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω), A(ω′)\A(ω) = ∅ ⊆ Li (a, ω)
for all i . In such a case, GCC prescribes choosing at state ω′ any feasible allocation
we have chosen at ω. Thus, GCC is a weak version of Nash Independence of Irrel-
evant Alternatives (see Roemer 1996, p. 55). When the feasible set does not depend
on the state of the world GCC coincides with Maskin Monotonicity. In the general
case, GCC says that if a is selected at state ω, is feasible at ω′, rises in everybody’s
preference ranking with respect to the alternatives that are feasible at ω′ only and no
better alternatives are available in A(ω′)\A(ω), then a must be selected also at ω′.
Proposition 2 A SCR is monotonic under generalized severe reversion if and only if
it satisfies Weak Unanimity and Generalized Contraction Consistency.
Proof (Necessity) In the proof s denotes the generalized severe reversion function.
We first show the necessity of WU. Let A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω) and let a ∈ F(ω)\A(ω′).
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that Li (a, ω) ⊆ {G} ∪ A\A(ω′) for all
i . Observe that Lsi (a, ω′) = {G} ∪ A\A(ω′) for all i . We can write Lsi (a, ω) =
Li (a, ω) ∩ A (ω) ∪ A\A (ω). From the hypothesis of contradiction Lsi (a, ω) ⊆{G} ∪ A\A(ω′)∪ A\A (ω) for all i . Since A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω) then A\A (ω) ⊆ A\A (ω′).
It follows that Lsi (a, ω) ⊆ {G} ∪ A\A
(
ω′
) = Lsi
(
a, ω′
)
for all i . As F satisfies
s-monotonicity, s
(
a, ω′
) = G ∈ F (ω′), which yields a contradiction. Now con-
sider GCC. Let a ∈ F (ω) ∩ A (ω′). Assume that Li (a, ω) ∩ A(ω′) ⊆ Li (a, ω′)
and that A(ω′)\A(ω) ⊆ Li (a, ω′) for all i ∈ I . We next prove that Lsi (a, ω) ⊆
Lsi (a, ω
′) for all i . Observe that both Li (a, ω) ∩ A(ω′) and A(ω′)\A(ω) are sub-
sets of the lower contour set of a at ω. We can decompose Lsi (a, ω) as fol-
lows: Lsi (a, ω) = Li (a, ω) ∩ A
(
ω′
) ∪ [Li (a, ω) ∩ A (ω)] \A
(
ω′
) ∪ A\A (ω). Then
Lsi (a, ω) ⊆ Li (a, ω′)∩ A
(
ω′
)∪ A\A (ω′)∪ A\A (ω) ⊆ Lsi (a, ω′)∪ A\A (ω) for all
i . Observe that A\A (ω) = A (ω′) \A (ω) ∪ [A\A (ω′)] \A (ω). From the hypothesis
A\A (ω) ⊆ Li
(
a, ω′
) ∩ A (ω′) ∪ A\A (ω′) ⊆ Lsi
(
a, ω′
)
for all i . It follows that
Lsi (a, ω) ⊆ Lsi (a, ω′) for all i . By s-monotonicity s
(
a, ω′
) = a ∈ F (ω′).
(Sufficiency) Let F satisfy WU and GCC. Let a ∈ F (ω). Assume that Lsi (a, ω) ⊆
Lsi (a, ω
′) for all i . We first prove by contradiction that a ∈ A (ω′): assume
a /∈ A (ω′). If A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω) , by WU, there exist an agent i and b ∈ A (ω′)
such that a Ri (ω) b. Then a Rsi (ω) b, and bP
s
i
(
ω′
)
a, because a is not feasible at
ω′, which yields a contradiction. Now let A(ω′)  A(ω). In this case, let i be
any agent and let b ∈ A (ω′) \A (ω). Then a Psi (ω) b, and bPsi
(
ω′
)
a, because a
is not feasible at ω′, which yields a contradiction. So far we have established that
a ∈ F (ω)∩ A (ω′). We next prove by contradiction that Li (a, ω)∩ A(ω′) ⊆ Li (a, ω′)
and A(ω′)\A(ω) ⊆ Li (a, ω′) for all i ∈ I . If this holds we can conclude by
GCC. Assume first that Li (a, ω) ∩ A(ω′)  Li (a, ω′) for some agent i . Let
b ∈ [Li (a, ω) ∩ A(ω′)
] \Li (a, ω′). We have a Rsi (ω) b and bPsi
(
ω′
)
a, which yields
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a contradiction. Now assume that, for some agent i, A(ω′)\A(ω)  Li (a, ω′). Let
b ∈ [A (ω′) \A(ω)] \Li (a, ω′). We have a Psi (ω) b and bPsi
(
ω′
)
a, which yields a
contradiction. unionsq
5 Non-rewarding reversion functions: applications
In this section, we apply the findings of the previous sections to withholding in
exchange economies, bargaining and taxation methods. In these environments, natural
form of punishment are available. In pure exchange economies endowments can be
confiscated, in bargaining problems agents can be reverted to the disagreement point.
If such forms of reversion are used, agents weakly prefer any feasible allocation to any
infeasible one. The difference with the generalized severe reversion function is that
some agents might be indifferent between a feasible allocation and an infeasible one.
If such reversion functions are non-rewarding, WU and GCC are not only necessary
but also sufficient for monotonicity.
Lemma 1 Let h be a non-rewarding reversion function such that, for every ω ∈ Ω ,
for all a ∈ A (ω) and for all b /∈ A (ω) , a Ri (ω) h (b, ω) for all i ∈ I . The SCR F is
h-monotonic if and only if it is monotonic under generalized severe reversion.
Proof It suffices to prove that if F is monotonic under generalized severe reversion
then it is h-monotonic. The reverse implication follows from Proposition 1. Let s
denote the generalized severe reversion function and assume that F is s-monotonic.
Let a ∈ F (ω) and assume that Lhi (a, ω) ⊆ Lhi
(
a, ω′
)
for all i . As h is non-rewarding,
a ∈ A (ω′). It follows that Lhi
(
a, ω′
) = Lsi
(
a, ω′
) = Li
(
a, ω′
)∩ A (ω′)∪ A\ A (ω′).
As a ∈ A(ω), Lhi (a, ω) = Lsi (a, ω) = Li (a, ω) ∩ A (ω) ∪ A \ A (ω). The claim
follows from the hypothesis that F is s-monotonic. unionsq
5.1 Exchange economies: withholding
Reversion functions might be rewarding in this environment. For instance, starting
from an allocation in which agents are given goods that they scarcely care about, if the
endowment of one good is reduced by, say, 1% and renegotiation does not entail any
cost, it is possible to renegotiate this allocation in a way in which all of them are better
off. The non-rewarding condition is plausible here if we assume that renegotiation is
sufficiently costly, e.g., delay, transaction costs, etc., for at least one agent.
Consider an exchange economy with n agents and K goods. We assume that agents’
preferences do not vary but that endowments do. Let ui be a utility function that
represents agent i’s preferences. We assume that ui is strictly increasing, continu-
ous and quasi-concave. Let Ωi ⊆ RK+ be the set of agent i’s possible endowments
and let
∏n
i=1 Ωi . We consider a form of punishment suited to the environment.
We assume that, should an infeasibility arise, agents’ endowments are confiscated
and a small punishment is assigned to each of them. Then, the allocation set
contains the set of the balanced net transfers, the generalized punishment point
and C , which represents the situation where agents’ endowment are confiscated:
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A= {x ∈ RK×n : ∑ns=1 xs = 0
} ∪ {C, G}. For all ω ∈ Ω the feasible set is A(ω) =
{x ∈ A : 0 ≤ x + ω} ∪ {C, G}.8 Then A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω) if and only if ω′ ≤ ω. In order
to describe preferences on net transfers, note that the utility agent i gets from transfer
xi when her endowment is ωi is ui (xi +ωi ). Thus, the utilities that agents derive from
allocations are state dependent even if preferences are not. For every i ∈ I , for every
ω ∈ Ω , let ui (C, ω) = 0 and ui (G, ω) = ui (0) − ε, for some ε > 0. Finally, let h
such that h (x, ω) = C for all x /∈ A (ω).
Remark 2 The reversion function h, as defined above, is non-rewarding. Let us check
that it satisfies (i) and (ii) in Definition 5. First, assume that x ∈ A (ω) \ A (ω′).
In order to prove that both (i) and (ii) hold, it suffices to show that there exists y ∈
A
(
ω′
)
such that x Ri (ω) h (y, ω) and y Pi
(
ω′
)
h
(
x, ω′
)
for some i . Consider the case
A
(
ω′
) \A (ω) = ∅. For all y ∈ A (ω′) \A (ω) we have yi = −ω′i for some i , then
x Ri (ω) h (y, ω) and y Pi
(
ω′
)
h
(
x, ω′
)
because preferences are strictly increasing.
The remaining case is when A
(
ω′
) ⊆ A (ω), then ω′ ≤ ω. Let i such that xi = −ωi .
Let y ∈ A (ω′) such that −ω′i < yi ≤ xi . Then x Ri (ω) y and y Pi
(
ω′
)
h
(
x, ω′
)
because preferences are strictly increasing. In order to complete the proof, we have
to show that (ii) holds for every x ∈ A (ω) ∩ A (ω′). First, consider the case A (ω′) \
A (ω) = ∅. In order to prove the claim, it suffices to show that there exists j such
that A
(
ω′
) \ A (ω)  L j
(
x, ω′
)
. Indeed, for any y ∈ A (ω′) \ A (ω) , y /∈ L j
(
x, ω′
)
,
we have x R j (ω) h (y, ω) , y Pj
(
ω′
)
x . As ω′  ω,ω′ik > ωik for some agent i and
for some good k. First, assume xik + ω′ik > 0. Set yik = −ω′ik , and set y jk =
x jk + xik + ω′ik > x jk for some j = i . Set yrl = xrl if r = i, j or if l = k.
Transfer y is feasible at ω′ but not at ω and preferences are strictly increasing so
x R j (ω) h (y, ω) , y Pj
(
ω′
)
x . Now assume xik+ω′ik = 0. Let j = i such that x jk > 0.
Let δ be such that δ < min
{
x jk, ω′ik − ωik
}
. Set yik = xik + δ, and set y jk = x jk − δ.
Set yrl = xrl if r = i, j or if l = k. Transfer y is feasible at ω′ but not at ω and pref-
erences are strictly increasing so x Ri (ω) h (y, ω) , y Pi
(
ω′
)
x . The remaining case is
when A
(
ω′
) ⊆ A (ω) then ω′ ≤ ω and let x ∈ A (ω′). If y Phi
(
ω′
)
x and x Rhi (ω) y
then y ∈ A (ω′) so (ii) holds.
In this environment the no veto condition holds emptily when h and the generalized
severe reversion function are used. From Lemma 1 it follows that a SCR is h-imple-
mentable if and only if it satisfies WU and GCC.
Let us translate conditions WU and GCC into this framework. First consider WU.
It suffices to consider only endowments ω,ω′ such that ω′ ≤ ω, because, as observed
above, A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω) if and only if ω′ ≤ ω. Then WU amounts to the following
condition:
Condition α For all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω such that ω′ ≤ ω , if a ∈ F(ω) \ A(ω′) there exists
i such that ui (ωi + ai ) ≥ ui (ωi − ω′i ).
Observe that if (0, ωi ) ⊆ Ωi for all i then Condition α only requires the SCR to
be individually rational for at least one agent. It is a very weak requirement and it is
obviously satisfied by many SCR, e.g., any Pareto efficient or any individually rational
SCR.
8 For x, y ∈ Rn we write x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for all i , x < y if xi ≤ yi for all i and x j < y j for at least
one j .
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Stronger requirements are imposed by GCC. In this case it also suffices to consider
only endowments ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that ω′ ≤ ω. Indeed, assume that ω′  ω. In this
case A
(
ω′
) \A (ω)  L j
(
a, ω′
)
for some j (see Remark 2). So, if ω′  ω GCC holds
emptily. It follows that GCC is satisfied if and only if the following condition holds:
Condition β For all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω such that ω′ ≤ ω, if a ∈ F(ω)∩ A(ω′) and a /∈ F(ω′)
there exists i and x ∈ A(ω′) such that
ui (ωi + ai ) ≥ ui (ωi + xi )
ui
(
ω′i + ai
)
< ui
(
ω′i + xi
)
Consider now a social choice function f : Ω → A such that f (ω) ∈ A (ω) for
all ω ∈ Ω . For every ω ∈ Ω let fi (ω) be the transfer that f assigns to player i at
ω, which is f (ω) = ( f1 (ω) , . . . , fn (ω)). Let us compare our conditions with Hong
(1998), Corollary 1, p. 216.9 She showed that f is implementable by a collection of
state dependent mechanisms if and only if, for all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω , the following condition
is satisfied:
ω ≥ ω′ 
⇒ ui (ωi + fi (ωi )) ≥ ui
(
ωi − ω′i
)
for all i ∈ I . (H)
Our Condition (α) is weaker than condition (H). Indeed, in this case (α) requires
only that ui (ωi + fi (ω)) ≥ ui (ωi − ω′i ) for at least one i when f (ω) /∈ A
(
ω′
)
.
Note that our condition depends on the fact that each agent cannot simply retain
part of her endowment. She has to make it compatible with other agents’ messages.
But our Condition (β) is not implied by Condition (H). Assume for instance that
f (ω) ∈ A(ω′). We have fi (ω) ≥ −ω′i for all i so ui (ωi + fi (ω)) ≥ ui (ωi − ω′i )
for all i because all ui are increasing. Then (H) imposes no restrictions on f (ω′).
If the translations by ω − ω′ of all agents’ indifference curves through ω′ + f (ω)
are strictly above all agents’ indifference curves through ω + f (ω), condition
(β) implies f (ω) = f (ω′). Formally, if ⋂ni=1
{
y : ui (ω′i + fi (ω))) = ui (yi )
} ⊆⋂n
i=1
{
y : ui (yi + ωi − ω′i ) > ui (ωi + fi (ω))}, condition (β) imposes that f (ω) =f (ω′).
Two of Hong’s assumptions make our approaches different: (i) Hong assumes that
players cannot exaggerate their endowment and that they can be punished for the
message they send and not only for the allocation they intend to obtain if such an
allocation is not feasible; and (ii) Hong gives each player the power to retain part of
her endowment. We assume that players can collectively cheat the planner through
the mechanism by asking for a feasible allocation in which some agents retain a part
of their endowment.
9 In Hong’s framework a mechanism is a pair
({M (ω)}ω∈Ω , g
)
. M (ω) = ∏i∈I Mi (ωi ) is the message
space at state ω and g is a function, g : M → A where M = ∏i∈I Mi , Mi =
⋃
ωi ∈Ωi M (ωi ). The
mechanism must be feasible at every state of the world, which is g (M (ω)) ⊆ A (ω) for all ω. Agents
are subject to no exaggeration assumption: when her endowment is ωi , agent i must send messages within⋃
ω′i ≤ωi Mi (ωi ). Such an assumption implies that agents use different message spaces at different states
of the world.
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Let us first study the implementation of the Constrained Walrasian SCR.10 The
allocation a ∈ A (ω) is a Constrained Walrasian Allocation (CWA) at ω if there exists
p ∈ RK+ such that a ∈ arg max {ui (ωi + xi ) : pxi ≤ 0, x ∈ A(ω)} for all i . Such a
p is said to be an equilibrium price supporting a at ω. Let CW(ω) denote the set of
CWA at ω.
Proposition 3 Let Ωi = (0, ωi ) for all i , for some ωi ∈ (0,∞). Then the Constrained
Walrasian SCR is implementable in Nash Equilibrium if h or the generalized severe
reversion function are used.
Proof Under our assumptions, CW(ω) is not empty for all ω ∈ Ω . In order to prove
the claim it suffices to show that CW satisfies Condition β. Let ω′ ≤ ω, a ∈ CW(ω)∩
A(ω′) and a /∈ CW(ω′). Let p be an equilibrium price at ω. Then there exist x ∈
A(ω′) with ui (ω′ + xi ) > ui (ω′ + ai ) and pxi ≤ 0 for some i . A(ω′) ⊆ A(ω) so
x ∈ {x ∈ A(ω), pxi ≤ 0}. From the definition of CW it follows that ui (ωi + ai ) ≥
ui (ωi + xi ). Then CW satisfies Condition β. unionsq
A similar result holds for fixprice equilibria. Here we use the definition of Younès
equilibrium (Younès 1975), though there are other concepts of fixprice equilibria,
such as Dréze’s (1975) equilibrium (see also Grandmont and Laroque 1976), which
includes restrictions on sales and Benassy’s equilibrium (1975), which uses rationing
schemes. Silvestre (1982) proved that the three concepts are equivalent.
Definition 9 Given a vector of prices p, an allocation x∗ is a Constrained Younès
Equilibrium at ω if it satisfies:
(i)
n∑
i=1
x∗i = 0
(ii) For all i x∗i + ωi maximizes ui on the set
{
zi − ωi : zi ∈ RK+ , min
{
x∗i j , 0
}
≤
zi j − ωi j ≤ max
{
x∗i j , 0
}
, p(zi − ωi ) ≤ 0
} ∩ A(ω)
(iii) There exist no pair of consumers (i, h), a commodity k and a real number ε > 0
such that ui (ωi +x∗i +εak) > ui (ωi +x∗i ) and uh(ωh+x∗h −εak) > ui (ωh+x∗h ),
where ak is defined by ak1 = −pk, akk = 1 and a jt = 0 for t = 1, k.
We obtain the following result using the same argument as in Proposition 3:
Remark 3 The constrained Younès Equilibrium correspondence is implementable in
Nash Equilibrium if h or the generalized severe reversion function are used.
5.2 Bargaining with unknown utility possibility set
Let us now consider non-cooperative implementation of cooperative solution con-
cepts (Dagan and Serrano 1998; Naeve 1999). A bargaining problem is a pair (U, v)
10 The Walrasian Correspondence defined by WC(ω) = arg max {ui (ωi + xi ) : pxi ≤ 0} is not imple-
mentable in Nash Equilibrium under a generalized severe reversion function for the same reasons that
prevent the standard Nash implementability of WC.
14
Implementation with renegotiation
where U ⊆ Rn+ is the utility possibility set and v ∈ U is the disagreement point. We
assume that U is convex, closed, with a non-empty interior and comprehensive (i.e.,
u ∈ U and u′ ≤ u, u′ ∈ Rn+ implies u′ ∈ U ). For each bargaining problem (U, v), let
Uv = {u ∈ U : u ≥ v} be bounded. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is defined
as NBS (U, v) = arg maxu∈Uv
∏n
i=1(ui − vi ). Let NBS (U, v)i be the utility awarded
to i by the NBS. For further reference we notice that this solution is characterized
by the following properties: strong efficiency, individual rationality, scale covariance,
symmetry, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
We consider Uv ∪ {G} as the feasible set of (U, v). We consider a non-rewarding
reversion function suited to the situation and assume that all infeasible allocations are
reverted to the disagreement point. Let h denote such reversion function, which we
will call non-severe because h(a, ω) = G for all a ∈ A and all ω ∈ Ω . Agent i’s
reverted preferences at (U, v) are described by
uhi (u, (U, v))) = ui if u ∈ Uv
uhi (u, (U, v)) = vi , otherwise.
The reversion function is non-rewarding. Condition (i) is satisfied because any infeasi-
ble allocation is reverted to the disagreement point and any feasible vector of utilities
different from the disagreement point allocates to at least one agent a utility level
strictly higher than the disagreement level. Condition (ii) is satisfied with b = c
and i = j . Assume that a Rhi (ω) h (b, ω) but h
(
b, ω′
)
Phi
(
ω′
)
h
(
a, ω′
)
for some
i . Then b ∈ A (ω′), otherwise b would be reverted to the disagreement point and
h
(
a, ω′
)
Ri
(
ω′
)
h
(
b, ω′
)
.
We first notice that if the disagreement point is not known by the planner, NBS fails
to satisfy GCC: Let n = 2 and let U = {x ∈ R2+ : x21 + x22 ≤ 1
}
. Let v = (0, 0) and
let v′ =
(√
2
2 , 0
)
. Then NBS (U, v) =
(√
2
2 ,
√
2
2
)
∈ Uv′ ⊆ Uv but NBS
(
U, v′
) =
NBS
(
U, v′
)
. Thus, according to Proposition 1, NBS is not implementable in NE by
any non-rewarding reversion function.11
11 This result agrees with the findings obtained by Serrano and Vohra (1997) in a different framework.
A different interpretation of preferences on the utility possibility set may lead to more permissive results.
One can interpret them as a measure of agents’ satisfaction with respect to the disagreement point. Let
ui (u, (U, v)) = ui − vi . Then the preferences induced by h are
uhi (u, (U, v)) = ui − vi if u ∈ Uv
uhi (u, (U, v)) = 0 otherwise
Observe that uhi (u, (U, v)) = uhi (u − v, (U − v, 0)). The reader can easily check that from the translation
invariance property of the NBS, the analysis of the problem with unknown disagreement point amounts to
the previous situation with the disagreement point fixed and known at 0. In this case, applying Proposition 4
yields a positive result.
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The Kalai–Smorodinski solution does not satisfy GCC even with a fixed disagree-
ment point. Proposition 1 implies that it cannot be implemented in NE by any non-
rewarding reversion function.
Instead, when the disagreement point is known, the NBS satisfies both GCC and
WU, as the reader can easily verify. From Lemma 1 it follows that it is h-monotonic.
However, we cannot conclude that the NBS is implementable because it does not sat-
isfy the no veto condition and the Maskin Theorem requires at least three agents (see
Remark 1).
We prove the result directly by using the characterizations developed by Moore and
Repullo (1990) (MR from now on).
Proposition 4 Let n ≥ 2. The Nash Bargaining Solution is implementable in Nash
Equilibrium with the non-severe reversion function if the disagreement point v is
known.
Proof Let x = NBS (U, v). We prove that the sets Rn+,
{
Lhi (x, (U, v))
}
i∈I , where
x = NBS (U, v), satisfy condition μ in MR (p. 1088). For every (U ′, v) they satisfy
condition (i) (MR p. 1088) because the NBS is h-monotonic, so it suffices to show
that they satisfy conditions (ii) and (iii) (MR p. 1088) for every (U ′, v). We start by
proving that they satisfy (ii). Let x = NBS (U, v). Let i ∈ I and consider a bar-
gaining problem (U ′, v). Let u ∈ Lhi (x, (U, v)) such that, with preferences reverted
at (U ′, v), u is maximal in Lhi (x, (U, v)) for agent i and is maximal in Rn+ for all
agents different from i , which is ui ≥ u′i , for all u′ =
(
u′i , u′−i
) ∈ Lhi (x, (U, v)) and
u j = max
{
u′j : ∃u′− j , (u′j , u′− j ) ∈ U ′v
}
for all j = i . To prove (ii) we have to show
that u = NBS (U ′, v). If u = x the claim follows from h-monotonicity. Then, assume
u = x . We prove by contradiction that x = NBS (U, v). Assume that u = NBS (U, v).
It must be the case that u is feasible at
(
U ′, v
)
otherwise, with preferences reverted
at
(
U ′, v
)
, all agents different from i would strictly prefer some point in the interior
of U ′v to u. Furthermore, u lies on the boundary of U ′v . As NBS is efficient, we have
x = NBS (U, v)i > ui . Consider the segment S joining x = NBS (U, v) and u.
S ⊆ U ′v because U ′v is convex and if t ∈ S\ {u} , ti > ui . It follows that S\ {u} ⊆ Uv ,
otherwise for all t /∈ Uv, t ∈ S\ {u} , t ∈ Lhi (x, (U, v)) and ti > ui , in contradiction
with the hypothesis that u is maximal for i in Lhi (x, (U, v)) with preferences reverted
at (U ′, v). In particular NBS (U, v) ∈ Uv and u ∈ Uv because Uv is closed. Further-
more, NBS (U, v) = x and x /∈ U ′
v′ , because u is maximal in L
h
i (x, (U, v)) under
reverted preferences for i, u = x and NBS is efficient. Uv is convex, NBS (U, v) ∈ Uv
and x /∈ U ′v so S′ =
{
u′ ∈ Uv : xi ≥ u′i
} ∩ S \ {u} is not empty. Let u′ ∈ S′, then
u ∈ Lhi (x, (U, v))∩U ′v , but u′i > ui , in contradiction with the hypothesis that u is max-
imal for i in Lhi (x, (U, v)) with preferences reverted at (U ′, v). Then u = NBS (U, v).
In order to prove (iii) we have to show that if u is maximal in Rn+ for all agents when
preferences reverted at (U ′, v) which is u j = max
{
u′j : ∃u′− j , (u′j , u′− j ) ∈ U ′v
}
for
all j , then u = NBS (U, v). The claim follows from the efficiency of the NBS. From
Theorem 1 (MR p.1088) follows that the NBS is h-implementable if n ≥ 3.
Finally, for n = 2, we show that the sets R2+,
{
Lhi (NBS (U, v) , (U, v))
}
i=1,2, sat-
isfy condition μ2 in MR (p.1091) for all (U, v). Above we have proved that they satisfy
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(i), (ii) and (iii). Property (iv) (MR p. 1091) holds emptily because of the disagreement
point. From Theorem 2 (MR p. 1091) follows that the NBS is h-implementable when
n = 2. unionsq
5.3 Taxation
A taxation problem is a pair (x, T ) ∈ Rn+ × R+, where x is the vector of taxable
incomes and T is the total amount to be collected such that
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ T (Dagan
et al. 1999). A tax allocation t for the taxation problem (x, T ) is a vector in Rn+
such that t ≤ x and ∑ni=1 ti = T . A taxation rule is a function f which assigns
a tax allocation to each taxation problem. We assume that the planner knows the
amount to be collected, T , but does not know the vector of taxable incomes x . Let
Sn(T ) = {t ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 ti = T
}
be the set of tax allocations that collect T . Let
Ωn(T ) = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 xi > T
}
be the set of the states of the world. Let T n(x) =
T n(x, T ) = {t ∈ Rn+ : 0 ≤ t ≤ x,
∑n
i=1 ti = T
}∪ {G} be the set of feasible tax allo-
cations at x . Each agent’s preferences only depend on her after tax income and are
strictly increasing. Then we can write ui (t, x) = xi − ti for each x ∈ Ωn(T ) and for
each t ∈ T n(x, T )\ {G}.
WU always holds. We now characterize GCC in this environment.
Proposition 5 A taxation rule satisfies GCC if and only if f (x) = f (x ′) for all x, x ′
such that f (x) ≤ x ′ ≤ x.
Proof The necessity of the condition follows directly from the definition of GCC,
because if x ′ ≤ x then T n(x ′) ⊆ T n(x). We next prove the sufficiency of the condi-
tion. Let t = f (x) ∈ T n (x ′). First consider x, x ′ ∈ Ωn (T ) such that x ′ ≤ x . Then
T n(x ′) ⊆ T n(x). This implies that f (x) ≤ x ′ ≤ x . It follows that f (x) = f (x ′).
Then, the condition required by GCC is satisfied. Now consider the case in which
x j < x ′j for at least one j . The condition T n(x ′)\T n(x) ⊆ Li
(
t, x ′
)
for all i is equiv-
alent to T n(x ′)\T n(x) ⊆ ⋂ni=1 Li
(
t, x ′
) = {t} ∪ {G}. It is impossible in this case
because the set T n(x ′)\T n(x) ⊇
{
t ∈ Rn+ : 0 ≤ t ≤ x ′, x j < t j ≤ x ′j ,
∑n
i=1 ti = T
}
is not empty and has the cardinality of the continuum. In this case, the condition
required by GCC holds emptily. unionsq
Under the no exaggeration assumption, any taxation rule can be implemented in NE
(see Dagan et al. 1999). It is no longer true in our framework. Consider the proportional
taxation rule, defined as
fi (x) = xi∑n
i=1 xi
T, for i = 1, ..., n.
Such a rule is not implementable in Nash equilibrium under any non rewarding rever-
sion function. We prove the claim by contradiction. Assume that f is implementable.
Let x∗ ∈ Ωn (T ). Observe that 0 < fi (x∗) < x∗i for all i . From the continuity
of f , it follows that there is a neighborhood U of x∗ that 0 < fi (x) < x∗i for
i = 1, . . . , n, if x belongs to U . Let x ∈ U ∩ {x : x∗ ≤ x} which is not empty. We
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have 0 < f (x) < x∗ ≤ x for all such x . As f is monotonic, Proposition 5 implies
that f (x) = f (x∗), which yields a contradiction.
More in general, let f be a continuous taxation rule such that for some x, 0 <
fi (x) < xi for all i . If f is continuous but not constant whenever incomes are larger
than proposed taxes for x , it cannot be implemented in our framework (the proof is
available upon request).
The difference between our result and the result obtained by Dagan et al. (1999)
stems from the fact that no exaggeration of incomes is possible in their approach. In
their model an agent is not allowed to exaggerate anyone’s income and not only her
own income as in Hong (1998). In our case agents are punished only if their message
leads to an infeasible allocation. To explain the argument, consider the mechanism
used by Dagan et al. to implement a feasible taxation rule f . At state x , a message for
player i is a vector of incomes yi = (yi1, ..., yin
)
such that yi ≤ x (the no exaggeration
assumption) and ∑nj=1 yij ≥ T . Payments are assigned according to f (y∗), where
y∗i = max
{
y ji : 1 ≤ j ≤ n
}
. Every player has to report the income of all agents with-
out exaggerating them. Agent i pays the tax she should pay if her real income was
the maximum income some player reported for her. Dagan et al. prove that the mes-
sages mi = x for all i , constitute a Nash equilibrium at state x . In our setup players
may profit from exaggerating other agents’ income if it leads to a feasible allocation
so such equilibria cannot be sustained. Consider a continuous taxation rule such that
0 < fi (x) < xi for all i . Assume that the contribution of agent i is a decreasing
function of other agents’ incomes.12 Let y such that yi = xi and yij = x j + ε for all
j = i , where ε > 0 is such that f (y) ≤ x . Then, when all other agents reveal the true
vector of incomes, agent i can profitably deviate by sending message y and paying
fi (y) < fi (x). She would not be punished because f (y) is feasible at x .
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a new approach to dealing with the implementation problem when
feasible sets are state dependent. It is based on the idea that feasibility is restored by
a process that is independent of the mechanism and that reflects how agents renego-
tiate infeasible allocations into feasible ones or the working of institutions designed
to cope with infeasibility. We have presented the class of non-rewarding reversion
functions and we have focused our attention in those that we call generalized severe.
We have shown that this class implements the maximal set of social choice rules and
thus, despite of its extreme form, it provides an easy test for implementability in our
framework. We have not provided a characterization of non-rewarding reversion func-
tions but this topic should be subject of further research. Finally, we have studied the
implementation in Nash equilibrium of social choice rules in exchange economies,
bargaining problems and taxation methods, and we have compared our results with
those obtained in earlier literature. In some cases, like bargaining, generalized severe
reversion functions are close to what the literature assumed but in others they are too
12 For instance, the proportional taxation rule satisfies these properties.
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extreme. Thus, it would be good to know which SCR can be implemented with less
drastic reversion functions. This topic is also left for future research.
A feature of the traditional approach of implementation when feasible sets are state
dependent is that it requires a collection of state dependent mechanisms, which stands
in contrast to the case when preferences are state dependent. This distinction differs
vividly from our intuition on how markets cope with infeasible allocations, namely
that the sign of excess demand entirely determines the adjustment irrespective of the
cause of infeasibility. Thus, our approach may offer a better understanding of market
mechanisms than the traditional one, though the traditional approach is better suited to
deal with topics such as withholding of endowments. Our approach can be generalized
to deal with this case by introducing uncertainty in the renegotiation process or by
writing the mechanism as an argument in the reversion function. These two extensions
are easy to write, but require completely new analytical methods and therefore are left
for future research.
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